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Compelled Investigatory and Testimonial Speech:
An Overdue Clarification of the Public Employee
Speech Doctrine that Rehabilitates "All of the
Values at Stake"'
Molly K. Smith'
INTRODUCTION
N Garcetti v. Ceballos the Supreme Court declared that "when public
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the
employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and
the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer
discipline."3 This categorical exemption4 blocks some of the most socially
valuable speech from the possibility of constitutional protection. A recent
circuit split5 between the D.C. and Second Circuits starkly illustrates
the need for the Supreme Court to carve out an exception to the rule for
precisely the type of speech involved in the case that generated it-speech
that exposes governmental misconduct and is compelled by the employee's
official duties. For this type of speech, the operation of the Garcetti threshold
question (Was the public employee speaking pursuant to an official duty?6 )
enable government agencies to control and discriminate against content that
is completely outside the scope of any legitimate managerial prerogative.
Currently, testimonial or investigative speech compelled by one's official
1 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 434 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting).
2 J.D. expected May 2013, University of Kentucky College of Law; MAT in Second-
ary English, May 2013, American University; B.A. in English & Political Science, May 2oo8,
University of Kentucky. I would like to thank Professor Scott Bauries for bringing the circuit
split at the heart of this Note to my attention; my classmates Kirk Laughlin and Visaharan
Sivasubramaniam for serving as springboards for ideas at a crucial part of my drafting process;
and Notes Editor Mason Powell for asking pointed questions that helped my argument im-
mensely.
3 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
4 It is not just the operation of this threshold question but the tendency of many lower
courts to give an overbroad reading to 'pursuant to official duties' that causes constitutionally
troublesome outcomes. See generally Scott R. Bauries & Patrick Schach, Commentary, Color-
ing Outside the Lines: Garcetti v. Ceballos in the Federal Appellate Courts, z6z Eouc. L. REP. 357,
372-82 (2oI).
5 Compare Bowie v. Maddox, 642 E3d i 122 (D.C. Cir. 2011 ), with Jackler v. Byrne, 658
E3d 225 (zd Cir. 2011).
6 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421
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duties is lumped into a category of speech that is never protected by the
First Amendment.7 This note argues that instead of suffering a categorical
ban, the subcategory of compelled investigatory or testimonial speech
should be afforded categorical constitutional protection.8 In the alternative,
this note proposes a more nuanced change to the Garcetti formulation that
would at least resolve the troubling discrepancy between Bowie v. Maddox9
and Jackler v. Byrne,"° two cases involving testimonial speech where the
courts reached opposite outcomes on nearly the same facts.
Part I of this note will trace the background and development of
the public employee speech doctrine. Part II discusses the institutional
and normative reasons why the categorical rule in Garcetti is a bad fit for
this area of First Amendment jurisprudence, particularly as applied to
compelled investigatory or testimonial speech. As part of this discussion,
Part II details poor applications of Garcetti. These poor applications include
Jackler v. Byrne,' where the Second Circuit engaged in legal gymnastics to
evade Garcetti and reach a just result, and Bowie v. Maddox,"2 a D.C. Circuit
case illustrating how the rule operates undesirably even when applied on
its terms. Part III justifies the need for treating compelled investigatory or
7 See id. at 426 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (summarizing the Court's holding, which categori-
cally bans speech made pursuant to one's official duties from First Amendment protection).
Most categories of speech are afforded variable levels of protection, rather than receiving full
protection or zero protection. See Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and
SecondAmendmentAnalysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 390-92 (2009) (explaining how various forms
of intermediate scrutiny apply to nearly all of the First Amendment's major subcategories,
from commercial speech to expressive conduct to time, place, and manner restrictions). The
Supreme Court has said that the First Amendment does not protect the following categories
of speech: (i) speech directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and that is
likely to incite or produce such action, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); (2) child
pornography so long as the applicable statute banning it explicitly restricts only works that
visually portray children in a sexually explicit manner, New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764
(1982); (3) obscenity if the regulation passes the three-part test in Miller v. California, 4i3 U.S.
15, 24 (1973); (4) most libel, see N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-8o (1964) (holding
that in order to comply with First Amendment freedoms, public officials alleging libel must
prove actual malice to recover).
8 While many in the academy have had a strong negative reaction to the Garcetti decision
and have called for a wholesale reversion back to categorical balancing, this note adds to the
discussion by synthesizing the arguments for exempting compelled testimonial or investiga-
tory speech and explaining what it is about this particular subset of public employee speech
that uniquely warrants a move away from categorical exemption. Currently there exists a
Catch-22 whereby an employee asked to give testimony can either make a false statement
and risk criminal charges or risk retaliation by making a truthful statement or by refusing to
make a statement at all. This note is the first scholarship to propose a narrow solution that
would fix the problem more satisfactorily than a wholesale reversion back to balancing for all
public employee speech.
9 Bowie, 642 E3d I122.
io Jackler, 658 E3d 225.
i i See id.
12 Bowie, 642 E3d 1122.
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testimonial speech differently under the law and offers both a narrow and a
broad solution for ensuring that lower courts do not apply the Garcetti rule
in a way that creates a barrier to open and honest testimony and reporting
by government employees.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE
A. Emergence of Protection for Public Employee Speech
U.S. courts offered little protection for public employees' speech rights
before 1968.13 As the Supreme Court's decisions have noted, for many years,
"the unchallenged dogma was that a public employee had no right to object
to conditions placed upon the terms of employment-including those
which restricted the exercise of constitutional rights." 14 The Holmesian
view that government employees could be disciplined for exercising their
First Amendment rights ruled the day for much of the twentieth century.1"
Writing from the bench of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in
1892, Justice Holmes noted that it was verboten to criticize one's employer:
"[t]he [government employee] may have a constitutional right to talk
politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."' 6
The United States Supreme Court did not have occasion to consider
whether the First Amendment protected public employee speech critical
of management until 1968, in Pickeringv. Board of Education.17 By that time,
13 See Washington v. Clark, 84 F Supp. 964, 966 (D.D.C. 1949); McAuliffe v. Mayor of
New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517-18 (Mass. 1892); Reagan v. Bichsel, 284 S.W.2d 935,937 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1955). See also Lawrence Rosenthal, Permissible Content Discrimination Under the First
Amendment: The Strange Case of the Public Employee, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 529, 530 (1998)
(describing the history of public employee free speech jurisprudence).
14 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983).
15 See, e.g., Adler v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Garner v. Bd. of Pub. Works
of L.A., 341 U.S. 716 (1951); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (947); United
States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396 (193o); Exparte Curtis, 1O6 U.S. 371 (188z). The Court steadi-
ly eroded Justice Holmes' view with a series of decisions that held that public employment
cannot be denied because of an applicant's previous political affiliations. See, e.g., Cafeteria
Workers Union Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 902 (i96i) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Wie-
man v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). In Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479, 490 (196o), the Court went a step further by invalidating a requirement that
public school teachers periodically disclose the organizations to which they belonged or had
made a contribution. Finally, in Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), the Court
interred Holmes' view when it invalidated two statutes prohibiting hiring or retention of em-
ployees of educational institutions who belonged to identified "subversive" organizations or
who make "treasonable or seditious" statements. See id. at 597-61o. See generally Cynthia K.Y.
Lee, Freedom of Speech in the Public Workplace: A Comment on the Public Concern Requirement, 76
CAL. L. REV. 1109, 1112-15 (1988).
16 McAuliffe, 29 N.E. at 517 (rejecting the right of employees to criticize their employers
and maintain their employment).
17 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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"[t]he theory that public employment which may be denied altogether
may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, ha[d]
been uniformly rejected."'18 Marvin Pickering was a public school teacher
who'was fired after writing a letter to a local newspaper criticizing the
school board's spending on athletics. 9 The Board argued that the letter was
"detrimental to the efficient operation and administration of the schools of
.the district" and that these interests justified Pickering's dismissal.2 0 The
Court took a standards-based approach in deciding Pickering's retaliation
claim,2 ' balancing the interests of the Board as an employer and the interests
of Mr. Pickering in participating in public debate:
[T]he State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech
of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses
in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry
in general. The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance
between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as
an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services
it performs through its employees. z
The Court concluded that the Board could not provide an interest
sufficient to overcome Mr. Pickering's interest in participating as an ordinary
citizen in important public discussion and upheld Pickering's speech under
the First Amendment.
2 3
Underlying the decision in Pickering is the recognition that public
employees are the members of the community with the most intimate
knowledge of the operations of public employers. Were public employees
not able to speak on these matters, the community would be deprived of
informed opinions on important public issues. Lessons from McCarthy-era
repression also undergird Pickering, the Court understood the dangers of
allowing the government to leverage its power as an employer to control
citizens' speech. 4 Thus it wrote "[I1n a case such as the present one, in
which the fact of employment is only tangentially and insubstantially
involved in the subject matter of the public communication made by
18 Id. at 568 (quoting Keyishian 38 5 U.S. at 605-o6).
19 Id. at 564-66.
20 Id. at 564-65 (citations omitted).
2i Balancing tests are prolific in First Amendment jurisprudence. See generally Blocher,
supra note 7, at 392.
22 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
23 Id. at 574-75 ("In sum ... in a case such as this, absent proof of false statements know-
ingly or recklessly made by him, a teacher's exercise of his right to speak on issues of public
importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment. Since no such
showing has been made in this case regarding appellant's letter.., his dismissal for writing it
cannot be upheld .... ").
24 Cynthia Estlund, Harmonizing Work and Citizenship: A Due Process Solution to a First
Amendment Problem, 2oo6 Sup. CT. REV. 115, 119 (zoo6).
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a teacher.., it is necessary to regard the teacher as the member of the
general public he seeks to be.""5 Relatedly, Picketing stands for the notion
that while a government entity has broader discretion to restrict speech
when it acts in the role as employer, the restrictions it imposes must be
directed at speech that has some potential to affect the entity's operations.
The next two major public employee speech cases involved Picketing-
like facts; each plaintiff was allegedly punished for speaking in an external
medium to a public audience about the policies of his public employer.2 6
In Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, however, the Supreme
Court clarified that neither location nor audience is dispositive when
determining whether speech is protected. 7 Bessie Givhan was fired after
a series of private meetings with her school principal where she criticized
district policies she considered racially discriminatory." The Court wrote
that the fact the teacher had spoken not to the public at large was "largely
coincidental" and held that the First Amendment protected her speech. 9
The Court further clarified the government employee speech doctrine
in Connick v. Myers.3" Sheila Myers, an assistant district attorney, circulated
an intraoffice questionnaire precipitating the First Amendment retaliation
claim in this case.31 Disgruntled after learning that her employer was going
to switch her to a different division, Myers solicited her co-workers' views
on, inter alia, office transfer policy, office morale, the need for grievance
committees, the level of confidence in supervisors, and whether employees
felt pressured to work in political campaigns.32 Myers was subsequently
terminated.33 In deciding whether the questionnaire was protected speech,
the Court recapitulated Pickering's language 34 to emphasize that Picketing
25 Picketing, 391 U.S. at 574.
26 See Mt. Healthy Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 282-83 (1977); Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 594-95 (1972).
27 Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 41o,414-16 (1979).
28 Id. at411-13.
29 The Garcetti Court purported to uphold Givhan: "Many citizens do much of their
talking inside their respective workplaces, and it would not serve the goal of treating public
employees like 'any member of the general public'.., to hold that all speech within the of-
fice is automatically exposed to restriction." Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 420-21 (2oo6)
(quoting Picketing, 391 U.S. at 573). This fact is one of the main reasons that Scott Bauries and
Patrick Schach's call for a narrow reading of "pursuant to official duties" is so persuasive. See
Bauries & Schach, supra note 4, at 369-71.
30 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
31 Id. at 140-41.
32 Id. at 141.
33 Id.
34 The Picketing Court articulated its balancing test in the following way: "The problem
in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees." Picketing,
391 U.S. at 568. The Connick Court wrote:
2O1[2-2013]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
had not held that any and all statements by public employees were entitled
to balancing; instead, a court need only balance the employer's interests
with the employee's if the employee establishes as a threshold matter that
the speech "constitut[es] speech on a matter of public concern."35 This
threshold question precedes Pickering-balancing in all cases. 6 In assessing
whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern,
Connick directs courts to examine the "content, form, and context of a given
statement, as revealed by the whole record."37 The Court found that all
but one3" of Myers's questions dealt with internal workplace grievances,
not matters of public concern, thus the Court did not resort to Pickering
balancing before it concluded that Myers's speech was not protected.3 9 The
majority wrote that to conclude otherwise would ignore the "common sense
realization that government offices could not function if every employment
decision became a constitutional matter." 4
As the public employee speech doctrine evolved, certain drawbacks of
the case-by-case approach of Connick-Pickering became apparent.41 Due to
the fact that almost all speech made by public employees, viewed at some
level of abstraction, can be said to encompass a matter of public concern,
4
We hold only that when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of
public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest,
absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate
forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public
agency allegedly in reaction to the employee's behavior.
Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.
35 Connick,461 U.S. at 146 ("Picketing, its antecedents and progeny, lead us to conclude
that if Myers's questionnaire cannot be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter
of public concern, it is unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for her discharge.").
36 See id. at 146-47.
37 Id. at 147-48.
38 The court found the question regarding pressure on employees to work on political
campaigns dealt with a matter of public concern. Id. at 148-49.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 143. Brennan dissented, reasoning that the entirety of the questionnaire circu-
lated by the employee "discussed subjects that could reasonably be expected to be of interest
to persons seeking to develop informed opinions about the manner in which ... an elected
official charged with managing a vital governmental agency, discharges his responsibilities."
Id. at 163 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (alteration in original).
41 Professor Cynthia Estlund has written: "In ranking public employee speech rights
somewhere between the oblivion of the old 'rights-privileges' doctrine and the expansive
speech protections accorded to 'the citizenry in general,' Pickering guaranteed a steady flow of
doctrinal disputes for decades to come." Estlund, supra note 24, at i 19.
42 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 448 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("There are, however,
far too many issues of public concern, even if defined as 'matters of unusual importance,' for
[Souter's proposed screen test in his dissent in Garcetti] to screen out very much. Govern-
ment administration typically involves matters of public concern. Why else would the Gov-
ernment be involved? And 'public issues,' indeed, matters of 'unusual importance,' are often
daily bread-and-butter concerns for the police, the intelligence agencies, the military, and
many whose jobs involve protecting the public's health, safety, and the environment."); accord
[Vol. IOI
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Pickering balancing was fairly easy for plaintiffs to access. This meant that
government agencies had to divert time and money to defend rote adverse
employment decisions that were, as often as not, both completely warranted
and constitutionally sound. Further, the case-by-case approach led to some
confusion. In United States v. National Treasury Employees Union (NTE U),
the Court struck down a broad congressional ban on federal employees'
acceptance of honoraria for making speeches or writing articles, regardless
of the topic. 43 The Court observed "[t]he speeches and articles for which
[employees] received compensation in the past were addressed to a public
audience, were made outside the workplace, and involved content largely
unrelated to their government employment."44 However, the Pickering and
Connick line of cases already made clear that neither audience nor subject
nor location of the speech was dispositive of protection, obviating the need
for this type of reasoning in NTE U.45 Some commentators perceived that
the Court altered the "matter of public concern" test for off-duty speech
that was not about the work or the employer.46 In reality, NTEU neither
followed nor reconstructed the threshold question for Connick-Pickering.
Rather, it established that employees who "speak or write on their own
time on topics unrelated to their own employment" are not subject to
Connick-Pickering at all.47 They enjoy both broader and stronger speech
rights than those who speak at or about work, but still not the full-fledged
protection of citizens at large."
Some lower courts interpreted NTEU to mean that it was never the
business of public employers to regulate off-duty, non-work-related
speech. 49 The Supreme Court corrected this misconception in City of San
Gillum v. City of Kerryville, 3 F3d 117, 121( 5 th Cir. 1993) ("[Our] focus on the hat worn by
the employee when speaking rather than upon the 'importance' of the issue reflects the real-
ity that at some level of generality almost all speech of state employees is of state concern.").
43 United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
44 Id. at 466 (alteration in original).
45 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 282-84 (1977), and Givhan v. Western Consolidated School. District, 439 U.S.
410 (1979) protected employee speech where the employing agency was the'subject of the
speech. Both Givhan and Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1987), protected speech
made at work.
46 Estlund, supra note 24, at 129 (discussing NTEU).
47 City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 8o (2004) (per curiam).
48 Estlund, supra note 24, at 132 & n.53.
49 See Roe v. City of San Diego, 356 F3d 1 1o8, 1117 (9th Cit. 2004) (quoting Tucker v.
Cal. Dept. of Educ., 97 E3d 1204 (9th Cir. 1996)), rev'd City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S.
77 (2004) (per curiam). In the Ninth Circuit's view, the point of Connick's threshold test was
simply to avoid entangling courts in the innumerable employment disputes that arose out of
mundane personnel disputes and grievances. The court had sought to mitigate the genuine
perils of the public concern test by converting it from a protected category that the employee
has to get her speech to fall within, to a residual category that the employee has to avoid falling
out of. See Cynthia Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an Emerging First
2012-2O131
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Diego v. Roe, holding that a police officer's self-starring pornographic videos,
though made off-duty, were not protected speech.50 The Court took an
expansive view of how Roe's activities related to his employer. Though the
uniform Roe wore in one of the videos was unidentifiable, "the debased
parody of an officer performing indecent acts while in the course of official
duties brought the mission of the employer and the professionalism of
its officers into serious disrepute."'" The Court did not reach the interest
balancing tier of Connick-Pickering because it found that Roe's speech
"d[id] not qualify as a matter of public concern under any view of the
public concern test.""2 City of San Diego stands for the outer reach of the
employment nexus.5 3
Between the City of San Diego decision in 2004 and Garcetti in May 2006,
the Supreme Court lost Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist and gained
Justices Alito and Roberts. In the interim, the Court seemingly tired of the
case-by-case approach. Apparent frustration with applying the two-tiered
Connick-Pickering analysis led a majority of the Supreme Court in Garcetti
to announce an over-inclusive rule that categorically denies constitutional
protection to a vast, ill-defined54 subsection of public employee speech.
B. Categoricalism Returns to the Public Employee Speech Doctrine
In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Court grappled with whether or not the First
Amendment protected the speech of an assistant deputy attorney in Los
Amendment Category, 59 GEo. WASH. L. REV I (1990).
50 City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84-85 (2004) (per curiam). In City of San Diego,
the Court held that the First Amendment did not protect a city police officer who was fired
after his department discovered that he was selling pornography on the adults-only section of
eBay that depicted him masturbating after undressing from a fake police officer uniform. To
reach this conclusion, the Court determined Pickering balancing was not warranted because
the "matter of public concern" prerequisite-as clarified by the Connick Court and later deci-
sions-was unmet:
The speech in question was detrimental to the mission and functions of the em-
ployer. There is no basis for finding that it was of concern to the community as the
Court's cases have understood that term in the context of restrictions by govern-
mental entities on the speech of their employees.
Id.
51 Id. at 81.
52 Id. at 84.
53 Estlund, supra note 24, at 135.
54 In Garcetti, there was no dispute about how to classify the employee's speech: he con-
ceded that he had spoken pursuant to his duties as a prosecutor. As a result, the Court had no
occasion to provide guidance regarding how to distinguish citizen speech from speech pursu-
ant to official duties in contested cases. In subsequent cases, however, the lower courts have
adopted disparate and conflicting approaches.
Petition for Writ for Certiorari at 2-3, Bowie v. Maddox, 132 S. Ct. 1636 (2012) (No. i i-
670), 2011 WL 5999532.
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Angeles who recommended to his supervisors in a job-required disposition
memo that a case the office was prosecuting should be dropped.5" Based
on communications from the defense counsel and his subsequent
investigation into the matter, Richard Ceballos believed the affidavits used
to obtain a critical search warrant contained serious misrepresentations. 6
The department disagreed, refused to drop the case, and Ceballos ended
up testifying for the defense in its (unsuccessful) motion to traverse.57 The
Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office subsequently terminated
Ceballos, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear his §1983 claim
alleging retaliation in violation of the First Amendment.
8
While the Garcetti Court acknowledged that there were important
competing interests at stake, 9 it articulated a rule that favors the
government's managerial interest over all others in every instance,60 both
in its plain language and in its susceptibility to being read in an overbroad
manner: "We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant
to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for
First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their
55 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413-14 (2006).
56 Id. at 414.
57 Id. at 414-15.
58 The Ninth Circuit held Ceballos's speech in' his disposition memorandum was
protected under the First Amendment analysis in Pickering and Connick. Ceballos v. Garcetti,
361 F3d i168 (9th Cit. 2004), rev'd Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2oo6). The Ninth
Circuit's opinion noted:
It is unclear whether the defendants content that Ceballos's memorandum is all
that is relevant here or that the other speech [his discussions about the warrant
with his supervisors, his testimony before the court in the motion to traverse,
and his communications with the defense attorney] to which Ceballos refers did
not occur. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that, for purposes of summary
judgment, Ceballos's allegations of wrongdoing in the memorandum constitute
protected speech under the First Amendment; accordingly we need not determine
here whether similar protection should be afforded to his other communications.
Id. at 172-73. On certiorari, the only speech at issue was the memorandum. See Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410,415-16 (2006).
59 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420 ("The Court's decisions, then, have sought both to promote
the individual and societal interests that are served when employees speak as citizens on
matters of public concern and to respect the needs of government employers attempting to
perform their important public functions.").
60 The Garcetti rule is of the same ilk that Justice Frankfurter used to warn about. Frank-
furter surmised that balancing tests are better suited to deal with the complexities of the free
speech doctrine:
Absolute rules ... inevitably lead to absolute exceptions, and such exceptions...
eventually corrode the rules. The demands of free speech in a democratic society
as well as the interest in national security are better served by candid and informed
weighing of the competing interests, within the confines of the judicial process,
than by announcing dogmas too inflexible for the non-Euclidian problems to be
solved.
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524-25 (1951).
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communications from employer discipline."'" In essence, the Court afforded
unprecedented 61 importance to the phrase "as a citizen" in the Connick-
Pickering analysis. The Court held that when a public employee speaks
"pursuant to ... official duties," he or she should never be regarded as a
regular citizen,63 elaborating that, because the additional First Amendment
values that citizen status entails are not implicated in employer-directed
speech, complicated interest balancing is not required. 64 This decision
greatly inflates the power of the government to control the content of
certain speech that it has no legitimate managerial authority to control.6"
61 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
62 In articulating the standard that an employee must speak "as a citizen on a matter of
public concern" as a prerequisite for the possibility of First Amendment protection of that
speech, neither Pickering nor Connick, though the Courts gave word service to the phrase, ex-
pounded on the meaning of, or gave any consideration to, the "as a citizen" half of the phrase.
See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 0968);
supra discussion at note 34. The Court's use of the phrase "as a citizen" in Pickering is best
explained as a rote reiteration of a related concept the Court recognized one year before in
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). Keyishian held that a government employee
does not relinquish all First Amendment rights otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason
of his or her employment. See id. at 605-06 (quoted in Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568). Additionally,
though the Connick Court observed that "[tihe repeated emphasis in Pickering on the right of
the public employee 'as a citizen, in commenting on matters of public concern,' was not ac-
cidental." Connick, 461 U.S. at 143. After the Court announced its holding, id. at 146-48, it used
the entire remainder of the opinion to flesh out the contours of the phrase "matter of public
concern." See id. at 147-5 1.
63 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 42 1.
64 Id. at 421-22. In his dissent in Garcetti, Justice Souter rejected the logic behind the
majority's decision to set up a dichotomy whereby an employee speaks either as a citizen or
'pursuant to official duties,' i.e. as an employee:
"[P]ublic employees are often the members of the community who are likely to
have informed opinions as to the operations of their public employers, operations
which are of substantial concern to the public. The interest at stake is as much the
public's interest in receiving informed opinion as it is the employee's own right to
disseminate it." This is not a whit less true when an employee's job duties require
him to speak about such things: when, for example, a public auditor speaks on his
discovery of embezzlement of public funds, when a building inspector makes an
obligatory report of an attempt to bribe him, or when a law enforcement officer
expressly balks at a supervisor's order to violate constitutional rights he is sworn to
protect. (The majority, however, places all these speakers beyond the reach of First
Amendment protection against retaliation.).
Id. at 433 (Souter, J. dissenting).
65 See Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial Prerogative,
77 FOROHAM L. REV. 33, 57 (zoo8) ("The concept of managerial prerogative attaches to duty-
related speech undertaken to advance the purposes of the public employer. This concept should
therefore also guide future litigation over whether speech should be considered duty-related
within the meaning of Garcetti; speech that an employer would have a legitimate reason to take
into account when evaluating the quality of an employee's job performance is speech that
falls within the scope of... managerialprerogative.") (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
This note urges that the content of compelled investigatory or testimonial speech is out-
side the scope of legitimate managerial prerogative; while the initial impetus for the speech
might be an employer's command, independent duties exist that require an employee to re-
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Exacerbating the problem, the majority refused to carefully delineate what
it meant by "pursuant to ... official duties," insisting instead that courts
engage in a "practical [inquiry]" 66 to determine which employee speech
activities should be categorically denied constitutional protection.
II. PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH DOCTRINE IN A POsT-GARCETTI WORLD
A. Institutional Difficulties with the Current Rule
Lower federal courts struggle to determine when employee speech
is properly categorized as made "pursuant to [an] official dut[y]."67
Compounding this general definitional problem, lower federal courts
seem to have forgotten that the only speech at issue in Garcetti was the
memorandum-not the testimony Ceballos provided in the warrant
challenge, and not the conversations he allegedly had with his employers
describing the results of his investigation.68 Lower courts have further
strayed from the spirit of Garcetti by losing sight of the important fact that
Ceballos's duties required him to write the disposition memorandum. 69
The indeterminacy of the category of speech excluded from Pickering-
Connick balancing, and the problems that come from not reading the
Garcetti rule in light of the facts before the Court when it announced
port truthfully. If the investigation or testimony reveals government misconduct, the truthful
report or testimony might upset the employer or put a superior's job security at risk, but would
remain illegitimate grounds for "evaluating the quality of an employee's job performance." Id.
66 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424.
67 Id. at 421. Scott Bauries and Patrick Schach point out that the opinion did not leave
lower courts without any starting point. By referencing Pickering v. Board. of Education, 391
U.S. 563 (1968) and Givhan v. Western Consolidated SchoolDistrict, 439 U.S. 41o (1979), the Court
signaled it was not overturning precedent holding that statements about work, or made while
at work, or made only to coworkers or superiors can still enjoy First Amendment protection.
From the majority's references, it is clear that "it would be patently incorrect to interpret the
words 'pursuant to' to mean 'related to' or 'in the course of,' as each of these interpretations is
directly foreclosed by the Court's statements of what it was not holding." Bauries & Schach,
supra note 4, at 369.
68 See Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F3d 1168, 1172-73 (9th Cir. 2004) ("It is unclear whether
the defendants contend that Ceballos's memorandum is all that is relevant here or that the
other speech to which Ceballos refers did not occur. For the reasons set forth below, we hold
that, for purposes of summary judgment, Ceballos's allegations of wrongdoing in the memo-
randum constitute protected speech under the First Amendment; accordingly, we need not
determine here whether protection should be afforded to his other communications."), rev'd
Garcetti, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
69 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 ("The controlling factor in Ceballos's case is that his ex-
pressions were made pursuant to his duties as a calendar deputy. That consideration-the
fact that Ceballos spoke as a prosecutor fulfilling a responsibility to advise his supervisor
about how best to proceed with the pending case-distinguishes Ceballos's case from those
in which the First Amendment provides protection against discipline.... Ceballos wrote his
disposition memo because that is part of what he, as a calendar deputy, was employed to do.").
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the rule, have led lower federal courts to exclude far more speech from
the possibility of First Amendment protection than the Garcetti majority
probably intended." A bevy of decisions illustrate how readily Garcetti can
be misconstrued and interpreted too broadly. For example, in denying
constitutional protection to a teacher who alleged he was fired for filing a
complaint with the union about his school's unresponsiveness to persistent
behavior problems, the Second Circuit reasoned that a duty does not have
to be "required by" the employer to be "pursuant to" official duties: "[the
grievance was] 'pursuant to' [the teacher's] official duties because it was
'part-and-parcel of his concerns' about his ability to 'properly execute
his duties[.]"' 7 In a like manner, the Fifth Circuit denied constitutional
protection to an athletic director who was fired after writing memoranda
to the school's principal and office manager questioning the allocation of
funds collected at athletic events." The court explained that "[s]imply
because [the plaintiff] wrote memoranda ... which were not demanded
of him, does not mean he was not acting within the course of performing
his job" and "[a]ctivities undertaken in the course of performing one's job
are activities pursuant to official duties."73 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit
held that a professor who complained to university officials about the
difficulties he was encountering in administering a grant was speaking
as an employee.7 4 Although acquiring grants was not necessarily a formal
requirement of the professor's job, administering the grant worked "for
the benefit of students" and therefore "aided in the fulfillment of [the
professor's] teaching responsibilities."" This loose interpretation of
70 Bauries & Schach, supra note 4, at 358 & n.x ("When the Supreme Court recognizes
an exemption from First Amendment protections, the lower courts have an important respon-
sibility to faithfully apply the exemption, a duty which includes the responsibility to read such
a rights-limiting rule strictly.").
71 Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of N.Y.C., 593 F3d 196, 203 (2d Cir. 2010).
The Weintraub court took dicta from Garcetti and inverted its thrust to reach the following
conclusion:
The Garceti Court cautioned courts against construing a government employee's
official duties too narrowly, underscoring that "[flormal job descriptions often bear
little res mblance to the duties an employee actually is expected to perform, and
the listing of a given task in an employee's written job description is neither neces-
sary nor sufficient to demonstrate that conducting the task is within the scope of
the employee's professional duties for First Amendment purposes."
Id. at 202 (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424-25). In fact, Kennedy's caution about the inquiry
being a practical one was in the context of an answer to Souter's concern that employers would
rewrite employment manuals so that every employee's job description would include speech
activities, therefore what was "pursuant to official duties" would be construed too broadly.
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424-25; id. at 431 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting).
72 Williams v. DalI. Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 E3d 689, 693-94 (5th Cir. 2007).
73 Id. at 693.
74 Renken v. Gregory, 541 E3d 769, 775 (7th Cir. 2008).
75 Id. at 773.
[Vol. 1o1
ALL OF THE VALUES AT STAKE
"pursuant to . . .. official duties"'7 6 was unfortunately not an aberration in
this circuit. In Mills v. City of Evansville, the circuit denied constitutional
protection to a public officer who made complaints after a meeting held to
discuss plans for department reorganization." The court reasoned that the
officer's criticisms constituted speech made pursuant to her official duties
because she made them "on duty, in uniform ... in her capacity as a public
employee contributing to the formation and execution of official policy."78
The Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have also drawn conclusions
that reflect that they do not regard public employees' duties as being
limited "only to those tasks that are specifically designated [by an
employment manual]."' 9 In Freitag v. Ayers, the Ninth Circuit held that
a prison guard's internal complaints documenting her superiors' failure to
respond to inmates' sexually explicit behavior toward her did not qualify
for First Amendment protection from retaliation because the complaints
were made "pursuant to her official duties."80 In Brammer-Hoelter v.
Twin Peaks Charter Academy, the Tenth Circuit held that teachers spoke
pursuant to their job duties when they discussed the school's expectations
regarding student behavior, curriculum, pedagogy and classroom-related
expenditures at an off-site, after-hours meeting."' Finally, in Battle v. Board
of Regents, the Eleventh Circuit construed "pursuant to official duties" to
capture a university employee's report of alleged improprieties in the way
her supervisor managed federal financial aid funds.8"
These differing outcomes across the circuit courts illustrate that
Garcetti's loosely articulated operational definition for the type of speech
it categorically excludes can be very detrimental to public employees'
speech rights. The fact that the post-facto inquiry into whether an
employee spoke "pursuant to . . . official duties" 3 has turned out to be
just as fact-intensive 84 as the Connick-Pickering interest-balancing test it
76 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
77 Mills v. City of Evansville, 452 E3d 646(7th Cir. zoo6) (citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421).
78 Id. at 648.
79 Phillips v. City of Dawsonville, 499 E3d 1239, 1242 (1 1th Cir. 2007).
8o Freitag v. Ayers, 468 E3d 5 z8, 546 (9th Cir. 2006).
8i Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 E3d 1192, 1204 (ioth Cir. 2007).
82 Battle v. Bd. of Regents, 468 F.3d 755, 761 (1 ith Cir. 2oo6).
83 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410,421 (2oo6).
84 Justice Stevens predicted this problem in his dissent: "[Tihe majority's position comes
with no guarantee against factbound litigation over whether a public employee's statements
were made 'pursuant to.. official duties,' ante. In fact, the majority invites such litigation by
describing g the enquiry as a 'practical one,' apparently based on the totality of employment
circumstances." Id. at 436 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal references omitted). This confu-
sion has come to fruition. See Decotiis v. Whittemore, 635 E3d 22, 26 (1 st Cir. 2011) ("[Despite
its categorical rule,] [niavigating the shoals of the standard articulated by the Supreme Court
in Garcetti... has proven to be tricky business...."); Davis v. McKinney, 518 E3d 304,311 (5th
Cir. 2oo8) ("Garcetti changed this analysis in ways not yet fully determined.").
2012-20131
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
aimed to replace undermines one of the main justifications for instituting
the Garcetti rule in the first place.8" The conflict among circuits8 6 regarding
the proper treatment of compelled testimony or investigatory speech is
symptomatic of the disparate, often inconsistent standards applied by
the courts of appeal to determine whether a public employee speaks as a
citizen or "pursuant to official duties."
B. Normative Reasons for Revising the Rule in the Context of Compelled
Investigatory or Testimonial Speech
"Vigilance is necessary to ensure that public employers do not use
authority over employees to silence discourse, not because it hampers
public functions but simply because superiors disagree with the content of
the employees' speech.
87
The circuit court decisions described above invert the thrust of
Kennedy's admonition that the inquiry for deciding whether speech is
excluded from the possibility of protection should be a "practical" one.
Decisions for the employer in the context of compelled testimonial or
investigatory speech like Deanna Freitag's or Lillie Battle's highlight the
unfairness of Garcetti, under which "any duty-related speech of a public
employee is denied constitutional protection, no matter how valuable
its contribution to public discussion and debate, and no matter how
unpersuaded a court may be of the employer's justification for suppressing
that speech.1
88
In Bowie v. Maddox the D.C. Circuit applied Garcetti on its terms,
illustrating just how unsatisfactorily the rule operates even under a narrow,
disciplined reading. David Bowie, a former official of the District of
Columbia Office of the Inspector General ("OIG"), alleged that he was
fired in retaliation for his refusal to help sabotage his former subordinate
Emanuel Johnson. Johnson lodged a race discrimination complaint with the
EEOC after being terminated from the OIG.8 9 An attorney representing
the OIG in Johnson's suit pre-drafted an EEOC-required affidavit for
85 See Garceti, 547 U.S. at 423 ("[To hold that an employee who alleges retaliation for
speech is entitled to interest balancing even when that speech is made pursuant to his em-
ployment duties] would commit the state and federal courts to a new, permanent, and intru-
sive role, mandating judicial oversight of communications between and among government
employees and their superiors in the course of official business ... to a degree inconsistent
with sound principles of federalism and the separation of powers.")
86 See Petition for Writ for Certiorari, supra note 54, at 13-2 1.
87 Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987).
88 Rosenthal, supra note 65, at 37 (emphasis added).
89 Id. at I Iz6.
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Bowie to sign.90 This affidavit listed Johnson's "failure to perform his
duties in a satisfactory manner" in three investigations as the legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason OIG fired him.91 Bowie refused to sign the
document, citing "misstatements of fact" and "language that would convey
impressions that [he] would not agree with."9 Bowie proceeded to draft his
own affidavit. This version retained mention of the problems with one of
Johnson's investigative reports and related his sense that Johnson "clearly
did not yet understand" his role at OIG,93 but went on to note that he had
advised management in a strategic planning meeting that he did not think
Johnson should be fired. Bowie related that when his superiors notified him
of their plans to terminate Johnson, he had recommended a performance
improvement plan instead because in his mind, the harshest criticism
leveled at Johnson during the managerial meeting was inconsonant with
the views of Johnson's immediate supervisors who praised him as a "model
investigator."
94
Bowie's supervisors never filed his affidavit with the EEOC. They
concluded Bowie's version "included too much information that was not
relevant to the issue at hand" which Bowie was unwilling to eliminate.95
When Bowie was terminated nearly a year and a half after Johnson filed his
Title VII complaint, Bowie claimed he had been fired for refusing to sign
the affidavit written for him and for drafting his own affidavit that implicitly
criticized his supervisors' decision to terminate Johnson. 96
The district court dismissed Bowie's First Amendment claim on the
first prong of a four-part test derived from the circuit's holding in Wilburn
v. Robinson;97 the court reasoned that Bowie's speech regarded individual
personnel disputes and grievances and therefore was not relevant to the
public's evaluation of the OIG's performance. 9 On appeal, Bowie argued
that the D.C. Circuit had already rejected the proposition that a personnel
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 1127.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at I133.
97 Wilburn v. Robinson, 480 E3 d 1140, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ("First, the public
employee must have spoken as a citizen on a matter of public concern. Second, the court
must consider whether the governmental interest in 'promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs though its employees'.., outweighs the employee's interest, 'as a citizen,
in commenting upon matters of public concern'. Third, the employee must show that her
speech was a substantial or motivating factor in prompting the retaliatory or punitive act.
Finally, the employee must refute the government employer's showing, if made, that it would
have reached the same decision in the absence of the protected speech.").
98 Bowie v. Gonzales, 433 F. Supp. 2d 24, 33 (D.D.C. 2006) (quoting Murray v. Gardner,
741 E2d 434,438 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
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matter per se could not be a matter of public concern.' Further, he argued
that his affidavit did in fact contain a matter of public concern because
he had composed it for the purpose of submitting it to the EEOC. 00 The
Court of Appeals rejected this argument, noting that Bowie's claim failed
for another reason: Garcetti. The court wrote, "even if the draft affidavit
and Bowie's revision of it were on a matter of public concern, he was not
speaking 'as a citizen' when he refused to sign the former or when he
composed the latter. In both instances, Bowie was acting "pursuant to this]
official duties ... ."o101:
Bowie's efforts to produce an affidavit were undertaken at
the direction of his employer and in his capacity as Assistant
Inspector General for Investigations and Johnson's superior...
Bowie does not allege Defendants stymied any personal effort to
submit his affidavit to the EEOC or to Johnson directly. Indeed,
Bowie made no such effort. His affidavit, like the draft he refused
to sign, identified him in the first paragraph and signature
block as 'Assistant Inspector General for Investigations.' All the
speech underlying Bowie's First Amendment claim occurred in
his official capacity.'02
Having decided that Bowie's speech was made pursuant to an official
duty to participate in EEOC's investigation, the D.C. Circuit ended the
inquiry.103 The court did not peek behind the curtain to ask whether the
employer's interest in suppressing Bowie's speech was justifiably high, or
whether the societal value of Bowie's speech was weighty enough to merit
protection regardless of the employer's interests.
One month after Bowie v. Maddox, the Second Circuit decided Jackler v.
Byrne. °4 Jackler was a parole police officer that arrived second on the scene
of an arrest and saw the first responding officer use excessive force on the
arrestee.' °5 After the arrestee filed a complaint against the offending officer
naming Jackler as a witness, Jackler filed a supplemental report as required
by the police by-laws. 0 6 Jackler's report stated that he had seen the other
officer engage in what he considered excessive force on the arrestee. 07
Subsequently, Jackler's superiors on the squad pressured him to rescind his
99 Bowie, 642 F3d at 1133 (citing LeFande v. District of Columbia, 613 F3d 1155, 116i
(D.C. Cir. 2010)).
ioo Id. at 1133 (citing Johnston v. Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist., 869 Ezd 1565, 1578
(5th Cir. 1989).
io Id. at 1133-34 (internal citations omitted).
102 Id. at 1134.
103 Id.
104 Jackler v. Byrne, 658 E3d 225 (2d Cir. 2011 ).
105 Id. at 230.
1o6 Id. at 231.
107 Id.
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truthful report and file a false one in order to exculpate his fellow officer. 108
He refused and was eventually fired. 10 9
Conflating the Garcetti holding with its dicta," 0 the Second Circuit
recited the threshold test to state "when a public employee, pursuant to his
official duties, makes statements that have no relevant analogue to speech by
civilians who are not government employees, the government employee's speech
is not protected by the First Amendment.""' To come to this formulation,
the Second Circuit emphasized the holdings of pre-Garcetti chestnuts that
were either implicitly or explicitly upheld by the majority. The court's
reasoning proceeded as follows: (a) a citizen who works for the government
is nonetheless a citizen and, when speaking on a matter of public concern,
must face only those speech restrictions that are necessary for their
employers to operate effectively; (b) speech exposing official misconduct,
especially within the police department, is generally of great consequence
to the public; (c) since citizens have the right to say only what they believe
is true, there was a civilian analogue to Jackler's refusals to misrepresent
the events he witnessed."' By articulating a "civilian analogue""' 3 for
Jackler's actions, the court was able to circumvent having the Garcetti
threshold question end the possibility of protection for Jackler. There is no
question that had Garcetti been applied in a straightforward manner on the
facts, the court would have found that Jackler filed his supplemental report
"pursuant to [an] official dut[y]."1 4 The Second Circuit attempted to justify
its convoluted reasoning by highlighting Garcetti's stated purpose in forging
io8 Id.
IO9 Id.
i1o See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 41o, 423-24 (2oo6) ("The Court of Appeals based its
holding in part on what it perceived as a doctrinal anomaly. The court suggested it would be
inconsistent to compel public employers to tolerate certain employee speech made publicly
but not speech made pursuant to an employee's assigned duties. This objection misconceives
the theoretical underpinnings of our decisions. Employees who make public statements out-
side the course of performing their official duties retain some possibility of First Amendment
protection because that is the kind of activity engaged in by citizens who do not work for the
government. The same goes for writing a letter to a local newspaper, or discussing politics
with a co-worker. When a public employee speaks pursuant to employment responsibilities,
however, there is no relevant analogue to speech by citizens who are not government employees.") (em-
phasis added).
iI I Jackler, 658 F3d at 229 (emphasis added). Of note, the Second Circuit first fashioned
this test in Weintraub v. Board of Education of City School District. of New York, 593 E3d 196 (2d
Cir. 2010). "Our conclusion that Weintraub spoke pursuant to his job duties is supported by
the fact that his speech ultimately took the form of an employee grievance, for which there is
no relevant citizen analogue." Id. at 203.
112 Jackler, 658 E3d at 241.
113 Id.
114 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. See also Jackler, 658 E3d at 230-31. As Bauries and Schach
would frame the "pursuant to" inquiry, Jackler would have been in breach of his employment
contract if he had refused to speak on this occasion. See Bauries & Schach, supra note 4, at
370-71.
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a categorical rule: to promote "integrity" in the government employer's
operations by limiting constant judicial oversight, and to help further the
"proper performance of governmental functions.""' The court concluded
that "Jackler's refusal to comply with orders to retract his truthful [rieport
and file one that was false has a clear civilian analogue ... [he] was not
simply doing his job in refusing to obey those orders from the department's
top administrative officers and chief of police."16
The defendants argued that Jackler's refusals were part of his job and
that Garcetti required affirmance of the district court's (reluctant "'7) dismissal
of Jackler's claim for failure to state a claim on which relief could be
granted."' Respondents argued that otherwise, any employee who simply
115 Jackler, 658 E3d at 242 (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419).
116 Id. at 241-42.
117 See Jackler v. Byrne, 708 E Supp. 2d 319' 324-25 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), vacated and remanded,
658 F3d 225 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1634 (2012). Judge Seibel's summary of cir-
cuit precedent and her disposition of the case evinces her doubts about the soundness of the
doctrine as applied to the facts presented by Jackler:
Speech is "pursuant to" official duties if it "owes its existence to a public
employee's professional responsibilities." Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. The
speech need not be required by the employer; it is "'pursuant to official
duties' so long as the speech is in furtherance of such duties." Weintraub,
593 F3d at 202. Jackler's refusal to alter his report was done in his capac-
ity as a police officer, and that refusal only occurred because he was an
officer. Ironically, it is because he was a public employee with a duty to
tell the truth that his insistence on fulfilling that duty is unprotected.
But because the Second Circuit made so clear in Weintraub that
speech is pursuant to official duties where it is "'part-and-parcel of [the
employee's] concerns' about his ability to 'properly execute his duties,"'
593 F.3d at 203 (quoting Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 E3d
689, 694 (5th Cir. 2007)), and that in determining whether an employee
speaks as a citizen the focus must be on the role the speaker occupied
when he spoke, see id. (same), and because it is so clear on the facts as
alleged by Jackler that he refused to withdraw or alter his truthful report
in the belief that the proper execution of his duties as a police officer
required no less, I do not see how I can avoid the conclusion that he was
speaking as an officer, not a citizen, when he did so.
Id.
Though the court ultimately dismissed Jackler's suit against the police department in
accordance with binding precedent, Judge Seibel suggested in footnote 5, "[blecause this
outcome is so troubling, I would encourage higher courts to consider whether Garcetti should
apply at all when the employee speech concerns a matter of fact, rather than a matter of judg-
ment, opinion, or policy, as in Garcetti." Id. at 324 n.5.
118 To state a prima facie claim of First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that: (i) the speech was constitutionally protected; (2) plaintiff suf-
fered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection exists between the speech
and the adverse employment action so that it can be said that the speech was a motivating
factor in the determination. See, e.g., Valentino v. Vill. of S. Chi. Heights, 575 F 3 d 664,670 (7th
Cir. 2009).
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files a truthful report and later suffers an adverse employment decision
would be able to claim that his First Amendment rights were implicated
because he did not file a false one."9 The Second Circuit was unconvinced:
"In the context of the demands that Jackler retract his truthful statements
and make statements that were false, we conclude that his refusals to
accede to those demands constituted speech activity that was significantly
different from the mere filing of his initial Report."'' 0
In response to Jackler's pronouncement, Bowie petitioned for a
rehearing. The D.C. Circuit was not persuaded:
The Second Circuit gets Garcetti backwards. The critical question
under Garcetti is not whether the speech at issue has a civilian
analogue, but whether it was performed 'pursuant to ... official
duties.' . . . A test that allows a First Amendment retaliation
claim to proceed whenever the government employee can
identify a civilian analogue for his speech is about as useful as a
mosquito net made of chicken wire: All official speech, viewed
at a sufficient level of abstraction, has a civilian analogue.'
The D.C. Circuit also derided the persuasiveness of the Second
Circuit's assertion that a police department cannot, consistent with the
First Amendment, force a civilian to withdraw a cofiplaint: "This begs the
question. Under Garcetti, the rules are different for government employees
speaking in their official capacities. An utterance made 'pursuant to
employment responsibilities' is unprotected even if the same utterance
would be protected were the employee to communicate it 'as a citizen."" 2
The D.C. Circuit further noted that all the dissents in Garcetti accepted
what the Second Circuit seemed to gloss over--that the rule categorically
denies recovery under the First Amendment to plaintiffs who speak
"pursuant to ... official duties."'1 3 All of these points are valid. However,
the D.C. Circuit ends with a sentence that disturbs the sense of fairness of
any reader already disgruntled with the categorical rule's displacement of
interests and values formerly accounted for in the Connick-Pickering regime:
It is not difficult to sympathize with the Second Circuit's
dubious interpretation of Garcetti. The police chief's instruction
1 19 Jackler, 658 E3d at 241. Because the department made an affirmative attempt to have
Jackler refile, to which Jackler affirmatively refused, defendant's slippery slope argument is
misused. In general, under this note's proposal, a plaintiff in Jackler's shoes will be able to sur-
vive the Garcetti threshold whether he affirmatively speaks or affirmatively refuses to speak.
It is the employee's ability to prove that the character of the compelled speech he made (or
did not make) was (or would have been) testimonial or investigatory in nature that will entitle
him to constitutional protection. See discussion infra Part III.B.4 and accompanying footnotes.
120 Jackler, 658 E3d at 241.
121 Bowie v. Maddox, 653 F.3 d 45,48 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citingJackler 658 E3d at 238-40).
122 Id. (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410,423-24 (2006)).
123 Id.
2012-2013]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
to Jackler and the actions he ordered Jackler to take were clearly
illegal. But the illegality of a government employer's order does
not necessarily mean the employee has a cause of action under
the First Amendment when he contravenes that order."'
The D.C. Circuit alludes here to the availability of whistleblower
protections in cases like Bowie's, but the problems with relying on
whistleblower causes of action are manifold' and discussion of their
shortcomings is outside of the scope of this paper. In any event, surely the
Garcetti Court did not intend its categorical rule to operate as the D.C.
Circuit sanctions.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. Narrow Tailoring
The paradigmatic situation where Garcetti's categorical rule should
not apply is when the party whose managerial interests the rule was
instituted to protect is found to be abusing its managerial authority. The
phrase "pursuant to official duties" simply cannot encompass any "clearly
illegal" '126 order. If we want our public employees to always contravene
"official" orders to lie-as we should-then we must always provide
such courageous employees protection for their speech under the First
Amendment when they do.1
2 7
The argument for managerial prerogative underlying Garcetti's
categorical rule only retains its legitimacy as long as the prerogative is
exercised within legal confines. Thus, as soon as the Supreme Court is able,
it should clarify that while its rule is categorical, it is not meant to operate
as a sanctuary for employers who retaliate against an employee's refusal to
comply with an illegal order, such as to perjure oneself in a report required
by police department by-laws or an EEOC-required affidavit. While
this clarification would certainly render Jackler's (and probably Bowie's)
speech protected, due to the reality that most facts will not be as clear as
a chief of police ordering an officer to lie, the Court needs to make a more
comprehensive clarification that will protect all compelled investigatory or
testimonial speech.
124 Id. (citing Jackler, 658 E3d at 238-40).
125 See, e.g., Peter D. Banick, The "In-House" Whistleblower: Walking the Line Between "Good
Cop, BadCop,"37WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1868 (2oi i).
126 Bowie v. Maddox, 653 E3d 45,48 (D.C. Cit. zol1).
127 See Bd. of Comm'rs, Wabaunsee Cnty. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 68o (1996) ("The
applicability of a provision of the Constitution has never depended on the vagaries of state or
federal law.") (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,
299 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
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B. A Broader Solution for a More Common Problem: A "Mosquito Net Made of
Chicken Wire' 2 8 for "Pesky""2 9 Speech that Garcetti Never Should Have Caught
1. Oversight.-In shifting its focus from the content of the speech at issue
to the role the employee occupied in pronouncing it, the Garcetti Court
minimized the legal relevance of the fact that a government employee
always occupies the dual role of citizen and employee. 130 The majority
implicitly rejected this "dual roles" argument, discussing its rule as if it
reflected a logic that was beyond cavil: "Restricting speech that owes its
existence to a public employee's professional responsibilities does not
infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen.
It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the employer
has itself commissioned or created."'
131
The Garcetti majority's logic undervalues the variety of interests that
were served by the delicate balances struck in Pickering and its progeny.
It also oversimplifies the issue by narrowing down the relevant interests
at stake to just two: the government's managerial prerogative and the
employee's interest in contributing to the public debate. Throughout
the opinion, the majority iterates the idea that self-actualization through
contribution to civic discourse is all that needs to be accounted for on the
employee's side of the balance. For example, when summarizing First
Amendment doctrine in the public employee speech arena, the majority
wrote, "The First Amendment limits the ability of a public employer
to leverage the employment relationship to restrict, incidentally or
intentionally, the liberties employees enjoy in their capacities as private
citizens."' 32 Later, the Court recited the principle "[tihe interest at stake
128 Criticizing the Second Circuit's holding in Jackler v. Byrne, 658 E3d 225 (2d Cit.
201i), the D.C. Circuit wrote, "[a] test that allows a First Amendment retaliation claim to
proceed whenever the government employee can identify a civilian analogue for his speech
is about as useful as a mosquito net made of chicken wire: All official speech, viewed at a suf-
ficient level of abstraction, has a civilian analogue." Bowie v. Maddox, 653 F3d 45, 48 (D.C.
Cir. 2011).
129 See Bauries & Schach, supra note 4, at 387 ("A reasonable objection to the Garcetti
rule is that it leaves categorically unprotected the speech of a public employee who is em-
ployed to audit the activities of [a] public entity .... [such as] an academic ombudsman,
an accounts auditor, or a professor with accounting responsibilities for an internal academic
center or funded grant .... In each of these positions, the employee's official duties require
the employee to engage in speech that has the potential to embarrass or upset the employer,
making retaliation more likely.").
130 See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech is Both Private and Gov-
ernmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 605 (2oo8). See also Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 430 (Souter,
J., dissenting) ("[A] public employee can wear a citizen's hat when speaking on subjects close-
ly tied to the employee's own job, and Givhan stands for the same conclusion even when the
speech is not addressed to the public at large.")
131 Garcetti,547 U.S. at421-22 (2006).
132 Id. at 419.
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is as much the public's interest in receiving informed opinion as it is the
employee's own right to disseminate."'33 Finally, the Court's dictum about
"civilian analogue[s]" arose in its discussion of how Marvin Pickering's
protected speech was different from Richard Ceballos's, a point it made
to assure that its decision was not intended to foreclose the possibility for
employees to contribute to civic discussion. 134
Distilling the interests at stake was necessary for the majority to justify
its decision. While one critique of the rule is that it blindly promotes the
government employer's managerial interests above all others in every
situation, the majority would defend its rule by refuting that either self-
expression or rich public debate is ever at stake when an employee speaks
"pursuant to an official duty":
Refusing to recognize First Amendment claims based on
government employees' work product does not prevent
[employees] from participating in public debate. The employees
retain the prospect of constitutional protection for their
contributions to the civic discourse. This prospect of protection,
however, does not invest them with a right to perform their jobs
however they see fit.' 35
Focusing so heavily on the fact that employees retain the ability to
engage in public debate, the majority never thoughtfully accounted for
how its rule would aid or impede the search for truth, one of the other main
theories that impacts the scope of the Free Speech clause.'36 Although
133 Id. at 420.
134 See id. at 422-24.
135 Id. at 422.
136 See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Explora-
tion of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1765, 1785-86 (2004) ("Although any account
of what the First Amendment 'is all about' will include some communicative acts and exclude
others--and so too with accounts that recognize that the First Amendment has multiple ex-
planations--none of the existing normative accounts appears to explain descriptively much of,
let alone most of, the First Amendment's existing inclusions and exclusions. Theories based
on self-government or democratic deliberation have a hard time explaining why (except as
mistakes, of course) the doctrine now covers pornography, commercial advertising, and art,
inter alia--none of which has much to do with political deliberation or self-governance, except
under such an attenuated definition of 'political' that the justification's core loses much of its
power. 'Search for truth' or 'marketplace of ideas' accounts are similarly at a loss to explain the
coverage of utterances without much truth value, including self-expression generally and the
self-expressive aspects of most art and literature in particular. Indeed, if we were concerned
about actually increasing knowledge and exposing error, it is far from clear that we would so
easily protect both communication that is largely emotive and communication that is demon-
strably factually false. Personal autonomy and self-expression accounts of the First Amend-
ment are also difficult to justify descriptively. For these theories, the inclusion of commercial
speech and noncommercial corporate speech is problematic, since it is not clear whose au-
tonomy or self-expression is fostered as a result; equally problematic is the inclusion of plainly
harmful speech, for it is not normally thought that rights to autonomy and self-expression
extend to the right to injure others.").
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distilling the values at stake was convenient for justifying the rule it
crafted, the majority's oversimplified analysis led to a rule that illustrates
how, "when a category does not align with underlying values, absurdities
such as significant [overinclusion] can undermine the category's legitimacy
and stability." '137
2. Overinclusion.-Perhaps the fact that Garcetti "represents the furthest
the Court has been asked to reach inside the employment relationship
to protect an employee from sanctions based upon speech"'38 explains
why the Court's categorical exemption is undertheorized. 139 Of course an
employer has the ability to control its "work product"'" and to discipline
an employee for "perform[ing] their jobs however they see fit." 141 No one
could seriously argue against the assertion that "[wihen someone who is
paid a salary so that she will contribute to an agency's effective operation
begins to do or say things that detract from the agency's effective operation,
the government must have some power to restrain her."' 142 Further, it is
incontrovertible that the government gets to control the message when
the government itself is the speaker. 43 However, the amorphously defined
137 Blocher, supra note 7, at 383.
138 Estlund, supra note 24, at 129.
139 Even Lawrence Rosenthal, who supports Garcetti's categorical rule, has observed
that:
The breadth of Garceti's holding is remarkable. Under Garcetti, any duty-related
speech of a public employee is denied constitutional protection, no matter how
valuable its contribution to public discussion and debate, and no matter how
unpersuaded a court may be of the employer's justification for suppressing that
speech. This outcome seems at odds with the Court's usual insistence that First
Amendment doctrine reflect the "profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and
that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp at-
tacks on government and public officials."
Rosenthal, supra note 65, at 37 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
14o Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422.
141 Id.
142 Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675 (1994) (emphasis added).
143 See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009) ("A govern-
ment entity has the right to 'speak for itself.'); Nat'l Endow. for Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569,
598 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) ("It is the very business of government to favor
and disfavor points of view...."); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (I99i) (holding that when the
government appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled
to say what it wishes, therefore it was not an unconstitutional condition to prohibit recipients
of federal funds for family-planning services from providing counseling concerning the use
of abortion as a method of family planning). Justice Souter's dissent in Garcetti noted that it
was a fallacy to conflate Ceballos's speech with that of other government employees whose
job it is to "hew to a substantive message" that is "prescribed by the government in advance":
The fallacy of the majority's reliance on Rosenbrger's understanding of Rust doc-
trine ... portends a bloated notion of controllable government speech going well
beyond the circumstances of this case. Consider the breadth of the new formula-
tion: 'Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee's profes-
sional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have
20][2-2][31
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rule in Garcetti that excludes all speech made "pursuant to . . . official
duties" from constitutional protection goes too far.144 It swallows too much.
Its underlying logic is especially ill-suited for justifying why government
employers should be allowed to retaliate, free of constitutional liability,
against employees who are compelled to engage in investigatory or
testimonial speech as part of their job duties.
145
Many government employees, as part of their official duties, are paid
to audit their government employer, complete ad hoc reports that detail
co-workers' misbehavior (Jackler), or comply with third party investigations
of their employer (Bowie). 46 In these situations, even though the employee
might be creating "work product" or reporting what they uncovered in an
investigation that they had an "official duty" to conduct, the government
has no legitimate, defensible interest in dictating the viewpoints expressed
therein. 47 This speech is different from traditional work product. It is not
enjoyed as a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer control
over what the employer itself has commissioned or created.' Ante at 196o. This
ostensible domain beyond the pale of the First Amendment is spacious enough to
include even the teaching of a public university professor, and I have hope that to-
day's majority does not mean to imperil First Amendment protection of academic
freedom in public colleges and universities, whose teachers necessarily speak and
write 'pursuant to ... official duties.'
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 437-38 (Souter, J., dissenting).
144 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
145 Id. at 434 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[The judgment in a public employee speech case]
has to account for the need actually to disrupt government if its officials are corrupt or dan-
gerously incompetent. It is thus no adequate justification for the suppression of potentially
valuable information simply to recognize that the government has a huge interest in managing
its employees and preventing the occasionally irresponsible one from turning his job into a
bully pulpit.").
146 See Bauries & Schach, supra note 4, at 386-88 (discussing how this subcategory of
public employee speech would continue to pose problems even after instituting his proposed
clarification to the Garcetti rule, designed to enable courts to apply the decision in a more
disciplined way).
147 I do not suggest that an employer could not monitor the content of compelled inves-
tigatory or testimonial speech in a way that resembles a justifiable time/place/manner restric-
tion. For instance, the Ninth Circuit noted in Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F3d I I68, 1171 (9th Cir.
2004), that upon reading Ceballos's first draft, his supervisors asked him to revise it and tone
down the accusatory language directed at the sheriff whom Ceballos believed had falsified
an affidavit to obtain a search warrant. This sort of managerial control is legitimate. The edits
Ceballos's supervisors ordered served the purpose of maintaining a professional relationship
with a fellow governmental agency whose goodwill it was important to maintain in order to
enable the D.A.'s office to perform its tasks efficiently. Lawrence Rosenthal has written:
[P]ublic employees [like Ceballos] who are hired to speak (and write) are not hired
to say just anything, but are hired to speak (and write) in the fashion desired by
their superiors. To the extent that the District Attorney abuses this prerogative to
run the office in a manner he finds optimal, in a republican system of government,
it is the electorate that is entitled to correct that abuse, not Ceballos, and not the
Courts.
Rosenthal, supra note 65 at 45-46. While I disagree with Rosenthal that correction of abuses
must wait until the next election cycle (a solution which assumes that employees will risk
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the typical speech the "employer itself has commissioned or created"' 4 s
whose message the employer may legally control. The Court should create
an exception to the category exempted from constitutional protection
by Garcetti for the subcategory of compelled investigatory or testimonial
speech.
Aside from the lessened legitimate managerial prerogative in controlling
compelled investigatory or testimonial speech, this subcategory is different
from other duty-required speech because of the legal consequences at
stake for the individual speaker. Garcetti indulges the falsity that a speaker
can speak either as a citizen or an employee by holding that the law should
always treat the speaker as a controllable employee when he speaks
"pursuant to [an] official dut[y].' 149 But when a speech act constitutes
compelled investigatory or testimonial speech, the individual speaker can
be held liable5 0 for the contents of his/her speech even though it is deeply
connected to their employment responsibilities.' This reality implicates
an additional long-held First Amendment maxim: truth is a defense.'
This additional consideration strengthens the argument for presumptive
categorical protection for compelled investigatory or testimonial speech.
3. The Solution.-While the general government employee speech
doctrine now starts with a threshold question that focuses on the role of the
employee when that employee spoke, I propose that a subcategory of public
employee speech be exempted from this rule based on an inquiry into its
retaliation to inform the electorate of abuses), I agree with his carefully phrased contention
that employers should be able to manage the "fashion" of an employee's speech. This is dis-
tinguishable, though, from the content of an employee's testimonial or investigatory speech,
which this note argues should be categorically protected under the First Amendment.
148 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 41 I.
149 See discussion supra Part I.B and note 62 (noting that the Garcetti Court brought rein-
vigorated focus to the "as a citizen" language of the Connick threshold question and answered
that the speaker never speaks "as a citizen" when they speak "pursuant to an official duty");
see also Barachkov v. 41B Dist. Court, 311 E App'x 863, 870 (6th Cir. 2009) ("In Garcetti v.
Ceballos... the Supreme Court clarified what it means to 'speak as a citizen' by holding that
'when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are
not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insu-
late their communications from employer discipline."')
I5O The more closely integrated with an investigation or trial, the more likely the em-
ployee will be held liable because prosecutors are more likely to seek punishment against
those who make false statements in this context.
151 Also, the greater the integration between the speech act and an investigation or trial,
the more likely the employee will be held liable for any falsity that protects an employer
because prosecutors are more likely to seek punishment against those who make false state-
ments in this context. Without protection for truthful testimony, public employees face the
Hobson's choice of protecting an employer at the risk of prosecution, or risking unemploy-
ment by testifying to something potentially harmful to their employer.
152 See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
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character and context. After an employer proves the employee's speech
is made pursuant to an official duty, the employee should be given the
opportunity to prove that the content of her speech is fairly characterized
as "testimonial" or "investigatory." If this is demonstrated, then the First
Amendment protects the employee's speech and bars it from being used
as the basis of an adverse employment decision unless the government
employer can prove the contents are false or "imply a false assertion of
fact."'' 13 Under this reformulation of the public employee speech doctrine,
an employer can still defend its employment decision by proving that it did
not engage in viewpoint discrimination in its evaluation of the employee's
speech or that it would have fired the employee regardless of the speech.154
This solution honors the object of most constitutional adjudication:
"When constitutionally significant interests clash, resist the demand for
winner-take-all; try to make adjustments that serve all of the values at
stake." '155 It recognizes the search for truth as a viable First Amendment
value that must be taken into account when deciding which public
employee speech receives constitutional protection.156  It affords
presumptive constitutional protection for the variety of speech that has
the most personal ramifications though it is spoken on the job but respects
the employer's managerial prerogative and the fact the speech was made
153 Standing Comm. v. Yagman, 55 E3d 1430, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995). This is the same
standard the Sixth Circuit applies when evaluating whether attorney speech that impugns
the integrity of a judge receives constitutional protection. See Berry v. Schmitt, 688 E3d 290,
302-05 (6th Cir. 2012) ("[Ain attorney's 'statements impugning the integrity of a judge may
not be punished pursuant to a professional rule of ethical conduct prohibiting an attorney
from making false statements about a judge, unless the attorney's statements are capable of
being proved true or false; that statements of opinion are protected by the First Amendment
unless they imply a false assertion of fact.' Even seemingly factual statements 'are protected
by the First Amendment if they cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about
their target."')
154 This is known as the "Mt. Healthy defense." See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (holding that after employee carried his burden of
presenting sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue as to whether his speech was a sub-
stantial or motivating factor in the employer's decision to discipline or dismiss, the District
Court should have gone on to determine whether the Board had shown by a preponderance of
the evidence that it would have reached the same decision as to respondent's reemployment
even in the absence of the protected conduct).
155 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410,434 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
i56 Schauer, supra note 136, at 1786-87 (recognizing that the search for truth, checking
governmental abuse, democratic deliberation, self-expression, individual autonomy, dissent,
and tolerance are each "historically recognized and judicially mentioned normative theories"
that have been cited to explain the scope of the First Amendment's protection, but proffering
"the most logical explanation of the actual boundaries of the First Amendment might come
less from an underlying theory of the First Amendment and more from the political, socio-
logical, cultural, historical, psychological, and economic milieu in which the First Amendment
exists and out of which it has developed.").
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at the employer's behest by not affording the highly protective defamation
standard to the speech.'57
4. Mechanics of the Solution.-To receive presumptive constitutional
protection, the plaintiff's speech must be compelled by some outside force;
in other words, it must be made pursuant to an official employment duty
(Jackler), in compliance with a third-party investigation (Bowie), 5 ' or in
satisfaction of an enforced external duty (such as the ethical obligation
imposed on government attorneys by Brady v. Maryland'59 that undergirded
Ceballos's behavior 6 °). This solution is designed in light of the current
trend among lower courts to read "pursuant to official duties" broadly.
The burden of proof would begin with the employer. If an employer
proves there was an official duty to speak, the burden shifts and the
employee is given the opportunity to demonstrate that her speech was
investigatory or testimonial in nature, a variety of speech this note argues
should be off-limits for viewpoint discrimination. If the employee is unable
to demonstrate this, then the Garcetti threshold would still apply, and the
speech would be treated as within the employer's prerogative to police free
of constitutional liability. In anticipation of such a situation, the employer
could cite Garcetti and win on a motion for summary judgment for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 6 '
157 See Berry v. Schmitt, 688 F3d 290, 302 (6th Cir. 2012) (refusing to afford the defama-
tion standard to an attorney who criticized a judicial panel's actions because there were profes-
sional duties at stake that meant that what was permissible speech for him is different than a
random member of the public). This rule fits in the context of a public employee because just
as an attorney can be punished (constitutionally) for more speech because of the existence of
ethical rules, more speech of the government employee can be circumscribed because of the
fact of government employment. It has long been held that "[a] government entity has broad-
er discretion to restrict speech when it acts in its role as employer." Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418.
158 See also Herts v. Smith, 345 F3d 5 8 1, 5 86 (8th Cir. 2003) ("Subpoenaed testimony on
a matter of public concern in ongoing litigation ... can hardly be characterized as defeating
the interests of the state .... Dr. Herts's speech therefore qualifies as protected speech.").
159 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that the prosecution's suppres-
sion of requested evidence that was favorable to the accused violates due process where the
evidence was material to either guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good or bad faith of
the prosecution).
16o In Garcetti, Justice Breyer discussed his reasons for contending that Ceballos should
have been afforded Pickering balancing on the facts: "Where professional and special constitu-
tional obligations are both present, the need to protect the employee's speech is augmented,
the need for broad government authority to control that speech is likely diminished, and
administrable standards are quite likely available." Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 446-47 (Breyer, J., dis-
senting).
161 This outcome reflects the notion that only the content of investigatory or testimonial
speech is clearly outside of the manager's prerogative to control, and when the speech does
not clearly fall within this category, even if it concerns a matter of public concern, the judiciary
should not second-guess the public manager's employment decisions regarding that speech.
Of note, this note's proposed solution affording presumptive constitutional protection to tes-
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If, on the other hand, an employer refutes that an employee had an official
duty to speak in the situation, the employee has the chance to rebut the
employer's evidence by showing that her speech was, in fact, compelled. 161
The burden would then remain with the employee to prove her speech
was investigatory or testimonial in nature in order to receive protection
under the First Amendment. In the case where the employer successfully
denies the existence of an official duty to speak but the employee is able
to prove her speech was investigatory or testimonial, the Connick-Pickering
balance would still apply, affording the employee at least the possibility of
protection under the First Amendment. 163 This type of balancing is fitting
for such a socially important variety of employee speech.
For this exemption to serve its purpose, the Court needs to carefully
define the touchstone for deciding whether speech is testimonial or
investigatory. This category cannot be defined too literally or the purpose
of the exemption would be thwarted."6 For instance, it would not do to
timonial or investigatory speech wholly disregards whether that speech addresses a matter of
public concern. Whether it does or does not (a) is a fact-intensive inquiry that has confused
federal courts in the past and is best avoided where possible and (b) (most importantly) does
not make it any less true that the government manager will not be considered the speaker
for attribution purposes and therefore has no business controlling the content of the mes-
sage. The fact that the employer or an external duty compels the speech act is proof that it is
"important enough" to deserve protection. See discussion infra Part III.B.4 and corresponding
footnotes.
162 An employee can rebut the employer's contention in a variety of ways. She could
reference a duty in the actual employment contract, a clause in a governing ethics code (if
applicable), or an outside law; establish an employment practice of requiring a report under
certain circumstances; or point to a concrete email where a superior delegated an ad hoc duty
that required the speech. Bauries and Schach proposed a formulation to narrow Garceti's ap-
plication and instructed employees on what they could use to disprove that their speech fell
under any iteration of the "required by official duties" categorical ban:
In the vast majority of cases ... there will be several employees of the same rank
in the same workplace who remained silent on the occasion in question, or under
similar circumstances, and were not punished. In other cases, such as those involv-
ing upper-management employees with unique job ranks and responsibilities,
the inquiry will be more difficult, but such employees will often have increased
bargaining power at the initiation of the employment relationship to negotiate the
speech required and permitted by their job duties, and these employees will there-
fore be better able to produce evidence of what was and was not understood to be
required by their jobs.
Bauries & Schach, supra note 4, at 371 (internal citations omitted). The inverse of this type of
evidence (employees who remained silent who were punished) could be used to prove that
certain speech was required.
163 For the mechanics of Connick-Pickering balancing, see discussion supra Part L.A and
corresponding footnotes.
164 See Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 3, Bowie v. Maddox, 642 F3d 1122 (D.C.
Cir.) (No. o8-51 11) 201o WL 472o699 at *3 (citing Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956)
for the proposition that "every citizen has a duty to provide truthful testimony before a duly
constituted tribunal unless he invokes a valid legal exemption in withholding it," and argu-
ing that the EEOC is a duly constituted fact finding tribunal, therefore Bowie's notarized
affidavit, prepared in response to EEOC's directive to his employer to compose a position
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confer the appellation "testimonial" or "investigatory" only if charges
have already been filed; this would exclude speech related to internal
investigations. While speech made after charges are filed would trigger the
characterization of "testimonial," "6 the term "investigatory" is intended to
capture a broader swath of speech that includes any speech that relates
to166 or could lead to civil liability, criminal liability, or professional sanction
for its subject. 67 This language comports with the understanding that
"[elxposure of official misconduct ... is generally of great consequence
to the public."1 68 This definition would at least be broad enough to cover
statement in the Johnson matter, should count as testimony), rehg denied, 653 F3d 45 (D.C.
Cit. 201 1), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1636 (2012).
165 Three circuits - the Second, Third, and Seventh - have held that sworn statements,
even when made at a government employer's direction or related to the employee's job, are
citizen speech entitled to First Amendment protection. In Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F3d 225 (2d
Cir. 201 j), discussed supra Part II.B, the court held that there was a "civilian analogue" to
the duty animating the police officer's speech, id. at 241-42, and that while it was concededly
one of Jackler's employment duties to file a witness report after an arrestee alleged excessive
force, "his refusals to accede to [his supervisors'] demands constituted speech activity that
was significantly different from the mere filing of his initial Report." Id. at 241. In Reilly v. City
of Atlantic City, 532 F3d 216 (3d Cir. 2oo8), the Third Circuit afforded constitutional protec-
tion to a police officer who was fired after testifying at the criminal trial of a former colleague
in a case he had investigated. Conceding that Reilly's "official responsibilities provided the
initial impetus to appear in court," id. at 231, the court wrote that this impetus to appear is
"immaterial to his/her independent obligation as a citizen to testify truthfully," id., and held
that "[wihen a government testifies truthfully, s/he is not 'simply performing his or her job
duties,' Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423; rather, the employee is acting as a citizen and is bound by
the dictates of the court and the rules of evidence." Id. The Seventh Circuit afforded First
Amendment protection to a police officer that was demoted after giving a deposition in a case
in which the Chief of Police was accused of transferring a police officer in violation of the offi-
cer's First Amendment rights. Morales v. Jones, 494 E3d 590,595 (7th Cir. 2007). Morales, who
was not otherwise involved in the case, was asked to testify about ongoing investigations he
was conducting; his testimony proved harmful to the Chief's litigation position. Id. The court
acknowledged that "Morales testified about speech he made pursuant to his official duties,"
but found that this fact would not "render[] his deposition unprotected." Id. at 598. For the
Seventh Circuit to conclude that Morales spoke as a citizen in his deposition, the dispositive
factor was that "[bleing deposed in a civil suit ... was not part of what he was employed to
do." Id. For decisions refusing to distinguish testimony from other speech made pursuant to
official duties, thereby denying constitutional protection under Garcetti, see Bowie v. Maddox,
642 E3d I 122 (D.C. Cir. 2o i), discussed supra Part II.B; Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d
696 (9 th Cir. 2oo9); Barachkov v. 41 B Dist. Court, 311 F. App'x 86 3 ,86 9 -7 0 (6th Cir. 2009) (cit-
ing Weisbarth v. Geauga Park Dist., 499 E3d 538, 545 (6th Cir. 2007)).
166 This language is intentionally as broad as some of the lower federal courts' readings
of "pursuant to" have been. See discussion supra Part II.A and corresponding footnotes.
167 In other words, the speech could be an internal complaint, and it would not have
to be sworn testimony. While this broad conception may seem to sweep the garden variety
employee grievance back in to a category of presumptive constitutional protection, it is im-
portant to remember that this note's proposed exemption is only afforded to speech the em-
ployer itself (or some external regulatory body) considers important enough to compel from
the employee.
168 Branton v. City of Dall., 272 F3d 730, 740 (5th Cir. 20u I); see also Garcetti, 547 U.S. at
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incident reports, affidavits, and internal compliance reports or memoranda.
The inquiry should focus on substance over form.
The backstop for this category is the requirement that the employee be
compelledto engage in the speech. This requirement responds to the concern
that "[glovernment offices could not function if every employment decision
became a constitutional matter"'169 and should assuage "fears of department
management by lawsuit."'70 This requirement (a) backhandedly helps to
ensure that the exemption protects only speech that the public would like
or need to know about, and (b) eliminates the possibility that an employer
can "have their cake and eat it too" when it comes to truthful reporting.
As to the public interest purpose of this requirement, theoretically, if an
employer (or outside agency, controlling law, or ethical obligation) considers
the matter or occasion important enough to require that a person report
on it, then there is a high probability that the speech concerns something
that (deservedly) can lead to liability or censure. Employers should not be
able to cover transgressions by retaliating against employees who perform
their duties faithfully.17' Next, the backstop that speech must be compelled
ensures that the only employers who will be affected by this exemption
are those agencies who have no qualms recruiting civic-minded people
and requiring truthful reporting for their own purposes and then retaliate
against the truth when it concerns embarrassing, inconvenient, or politically
harmful information.
Under my proposed framework, employees could not initiate their own
investigations and receive the protection for testimonial or investigatory
speech that this note urges. 7 While this caveat may leave unprotected
certain speech that deserves protection, in order for the proposed
exemption to be administrable, respite for such employees must lie in
whistle-blower protection laws. However, this note's proposed exemption
would likely result in positive changes that would eventually trickle down
to conscientious whistleblowers who do not have an official duty to report.
425 ("[G]overnmental... misconduct is a matter of considerable significance.").
169 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419 (internal citations omitted).
170 Id. at 446 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
171 Justice Souter echoed a similar sentiment in his dissent in Garcetti:
The need for balance hardly disappears when an employee speaks on matters his
job requires him to address; rather, it seems obvious that the individual and pub-
lic value of such speech is no less, and may well be greater, when the employee
speaks pursuant to his duties in addressing a subject he knows intimately for the
very reason that it falls within his duties.
Id. at 430-31 (Souter, J., dissenting).
172 This restriction comports with the recognition that "[sipeech that, although touching
on a topic of general importance, primarily concerns an issue that is 'personal in nature and
generally related to [the speaker's] own situation,' such as his or her assignments, promotion,
or salary, does not address matters of public concern." Jackler v. Byrne, 658 E3d 225, 236 (2d
Cir. 2011) (citing Ezekwo v. NYC Health & Hosps. Corp., 940 E2d 775, 781 (2d Cir 1991)).
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Namely, if the exemption this note proposes were adopted, it is foreseeable
that employers will push to define employment duties more carefully and
circumspectly. This would mean less employee speech would be restricted
from Pickering interest balancing at Garcetti's threshold question in the first
place; individual employees who speak out on matters of public concern
will retain the possibility of constitutional protection, eliminating the need
to resort to whistle-blower actions. Additionally, if this note's exemption
were adopted, public officials would have greater incentive to be more
receptive to constructive criticism offered by their employees, which would
help to prevent costly litigation altogether in some cases.
One last note about the employe 's burden of production: it eliminates
the need for the semantic battle between whether an employee was fired
for writing a truthful report or fired for refusing to make a false one. 73 As
long as an employee had a duty to speak on the occasion in question and can
show that the speech was created for testimonial or investigatory purposes,
then her speech or refusal to speak can form the basis of a challenge to her
employer's action. While an opposite rule would arguably aid government
efficiency by ensuring that all required reports and communications are
actually made, sometimes the government agency simply ought to be
disrupted because "its officials are corrupt or dangerously incompetent."
174
CONCLUSION
In sum, when a government employee speaks truthfully under a
compulsion to speak, either from an official duty, an external duty, or a
combination of the two, and when that speech is testimonial or investigatory
in nature, the legal calculus changes. When it comes to an employee's
version of the truth in a situation where she must speak to ensure that she
keeps her job and must speak truthfully to avoid liability, no longer does it
suffice to cite the government employer's heightened managerial interest
as a reason to categorically deny constitutional protection to the employee's
speech. More is at stake than the employee's interest in the unimpeded
exercise of her right to self-expression. Fifty years ago, the Supreme Court
recognized:
The effective functioning of a free government like ours
depends largely on the force of an informed public opinion.
This calls for the widest possible understanding of the quality of
173 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at io-i i, Byrne v. Jackler, 132 S. Ct. 1634 (2011) (No.
I11517),201 WL 5059136 at *io- I , cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1634 (2011).
174 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 434 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that in the circumstance of
government corruption or incompetence, "[ilt is... no adequate justification for the suppres-
sion of potentially valuable information simply to recognize that the government has a huge
interest in managing its employees and preventing the occasional irresponsible one from turn-
ing his job into a bully pulpit.").
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government service rendered by all elective or appointed public
officials or employees.
7 5
When we deny employees constitutional protection for the content
of truthful communications made at the behest of a public employer, we
reduce the possibility that government misconduct or incompetence will
ever be exposed. 7 6 When the interests at stake are as important as they
are in the public employee speech context, courts should both expect
and tolerate more nuanced rules of decision. Our highest court would go
a long way toward rehabilitating "all of the [First Amendment] values at
stake"' 77 by exempting compelled investigatory and testimonial speech
from Garcetti's operation at its first opportunity.
175 Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 577 (1959).
176 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 439-40 & nn.8-i (Souter, J., dissenting) (countering the ma-
jority's view that the First Amendment has "little ... work to do" in the realm of government
whistleblower protection due to an "assertedly comprehensive complement of state and na-
tional statutes protecting [them] from vindictive bosses," Souter points out multifarious short-
comings with whistleblower protection laws and notes that "'the applicability of a provision of
the Constitution has never depended on the vagaries of state or federal law."').
177 Id. at 434 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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